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The current paper examines a multinational ﬁrm’s choice between diﬀerent
modes of foreign direct investment (FDI). In particular, we let the ﬁrm choose
between the following strategies for selling goods in the host country: (i)
greenﬁeld investment, i.e., setting up a plant in the host country to produce
goods locally; (ii) acquisition of a local ﬁrm and its production capacity
(M&A); (iii) cooperation with a local ﬁrm by setting up a joint venture;
(iv) exporting goods produced in an existing plant in the home country. We
show that the proﬁtability of greenﬁeld investment has an important indirect
eﬀect on the choice of a joint venture or a merger, since it determines the
outside option of the potential acquisition target or joint venture partner.
Hence, even if greenﬁeld investment is not observed in equilibrium, it makes
target/partner ﬁrms agree to deals they would otherwise not have agreed to.
In particular, we ﬁnd that if greenﬁeld investment is a viable option and
the other FDI modes involve suﬃciently low ﬁxed costs, a joint venture will
be agreed to by the local ﬁrm, and the multinational prefers a joint venture
to a merger. Furthermore, the multinational prefers a merger to greenﬁeld
investment if the ﬁxed cost of greenﬁeld investment is suﬃciently large. If
greenﬁeld investment is less proﬁtable than exporting, local ﬁrms may refuse
to participate in a joint venture, leaving the multinational to choose between
M&A and exporting.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has received an enormous amount of at-
tention in the literature.1 Most of this literature has dealt exclusively with a
single mode of FDI, mainly greenﬁeld investment, and to a lesser extent with
international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and joint ventures. This pa-
1See Markusen (2002) for a recent survey. For empirical papers, see Blonigen, Davis
and Head (2002), and Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001).
2per, however, is not the ﬁrst to explore the interdependence between diﬀerent
modes of FDI. It is closest to Bjorvatn (2004) who considers the interaction
between M&A, greenﬁeld investment and trade.2 The novelty of our paper is
that we allow for the possibility to form a joint venture, and that we endogen-
ize the synergies that make a merger or a joint venture attractive options for
the multinational. In particular, we assume that these synergies are the result
of joint investments into cost reduction. The diﬀerent incentives that M&As
and joint ventures create for this investment — in addition to the diﬀerent
strategic eﬀects on host market competition — create trade-oﬀs for the choice
between FDI modes. Another diﬀerence is that we allow the multinational
to serve the foreign market through exports if a merger or joint venture oﬀer
has been declined; this, too, has implications for the choice of market-entry
mode.3
2 The Model
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that there are
two local ﬁrms in the host country, and a single multinational ﬁrm that con-
siders how to enter this country’s market. The multinational has the following
options: it may acquire a local ﬁrm; it may cooperate with a local ﬁrm by
setting up joint venture; it may choose greenﬁeld investment, i.e., set up a
plant in the host country; and it may export goods produced in an exist-
ing plant in its home country. If the multinational proposes a merger or a
2See Raﬀ, Ryan and Stähler (2006) for empirical evidence. Horn and Persson (2001),
and Nocke and Yeaple (2007) oﬀer other models of the choice between M&A and greenﬁeld
investment, as well as further references.
3Papers like Head and Ries (2003), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), and Nocke
and Yeaple (2007) emphasize the importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity in marginal costs for
the choice between FDI and exporting. To a certain extent, the current paper explains
endogenously the heterogeneity of ﬁrms in case of a merger or joint venture, because ﬁrms
undertake cost-reducing investment.
3joint venture, it makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to one of the (identical) local
ﬁrms. Since the local ﬁrms are ex ante symmetric, it does not matter which
local ﬁrm will be the potential target. We will label the multinational ﬁrm as
ﬁrm 1, and the potential target as ﬁrm 2, leaving ﬁrm 3 as an independent
producer in all scenarios. In case of a merger, only ﬁrm 1 survives, ﬁrm 2
becomes ﬁrm 1’s division.
Mergers and joint ventures diﬀer from greenﬁeld investment, because they
oﬀer the participating ﬁrms the possibility to realize synergies. These syner-
gies, however, do not arise exogenously. Rather they require investment by
the partners. In case of a merger, ﬁrm 1 determines how much each division
of the ﬁrm is to invest; the merged ﬁrm’s total output is determined centrally
by ﬁrm 1. In case of a joint venture, partner ﬁrms 1 and 2 individually decide
how much to invest; but each ﬁrm’s investment also beneﬁts the other ﬁrm;
each ﬁrm continues to choose output independently. Note that the proposals
of a merger and a joint venture diﬀer in another respect. In case of a merger
proposal, ﬁrm 1 oﬀers a payment to acquire ﬁrm 2 that ﬁrm 2 either accepts
or rejects. If the proposal is accepted, ﬁrm 2 is compensated by this pay-
ment for giving up its independent business. A joint venture only serves as
a platform for (partial) cooperation between the ﬁrms; there hence are no
side-payments.4
The order of moves in the game is as follows: ﬁrm 1 makes local ﬁrm 2
either a merger or a joint venture proposal. Firm 2 either rejects or accepts
this proposal. If the oﬀer is rejected, the multinational chooses whether to
engage in greenﬁeld investment or to export. In case of an accepted merger,
the multinational determines cost-reducing investments for both divisions,
4In this sense, joint ventures in our model are similar to R&D cooperation or any
other form of semi-collusion. For the pioneering paper in this ﬁeld, see D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988).
4and in case of an accepted joint venture, ﬁrms 1 and 2 determine simultan-
eously their individual cost-reducing investments. Finally, all independent
ﬁrms choose output levels as Cournot competitors. Note that letting ﬁrm 1
ﬁrst make a joint venture or merger proposal does not restrict its ability to
choose greenﬁeld investment or exporting. For instance, if it prefers greenﬁeld
investment to M&A, it can simply propose an unacceptably small payment
to ﬁrm 2.
Due to quadratic, quasi-linear preferences in the host country, the inverse
demand function is given by p = a − bQ with p denoting the equilibrium
price for an aggregate supply of Q. The marginal cost of production without
any cost saving by a merger or a joint venture is equal to c with c < a.
However, if the multinational serves the market by exports, an additional
trade cost of size t per unit of exports arises, where t ≤ (a − c)/3. The
latter assumption will guarantee that exporting yields non-negative proﬁts.
Furthermore, we assume that greenﬁeld investment requires a ﬁxed cost of
size F. We make the simplifying assumption that the other FDI modes do
not involve ﬁxed costs. Hence one can view F as the diﬀerential ﬁxed cost of
greenﬁeld investment relative to M&A and joint ventures.5
If the multinational exports, proﬁt maximization by all three ﬁrms leads














a − c + t
4b
, (1)
5Obviously introducing ﬁxed costs only for greenﬁeld investment restricts the type of
FDI mode choices one observes in equilibrium. However, this assumption allows us to high-
light the indirect role that greenﬁeld investment plays in determining the choice between
M&A and joint venture. This role comes about because the proﬁtability of greenﬁeld in-
vestment determines that outside opportunities of ﬁrm 2. It is straightforward to check
how the introduction of (diﬀerent) ﬁxed costs for M&A and joint ventures would aﬀect















(a − c + t)2
16b
, (2)
respectively, where qi and Πi denote individual production and proﬁts of ﬁrm
i. The superscript T denotes the exporting regime.
3 Modes of Foreign Direct Investment
In this section we discuss in more detail the diﬀerent FDI modes, and provide
equilibrium outputs and proﬁts for each FDI mode. These proﬁts will be
compared in the next section to determine the equilibrium FDI mode.
3.1 Greenﬁeld Investment
Greenﬁeld investment, denoted by the superscript GF, allows the multina-
tional to produce with marginal cost c in the host market. The individual











and the proﬁts of the multinational diﬀer only by the ﬁxed cost F from the














Using (2) and (4) it is straightforward to show that the multinational will
prefer to make a greenﬁeld investment rather than to serve the foreign market
by exports if F is less than
  F ≡
3(2(a − c) − 3t)t
16b
. (5)
6Note that F ≤   F is also the condition for greenﬁeld investment to be a
credible threat if the merger or joint venture proposal is turned down by ﬁrm
2. If condition (5) is fulﬁlled, any merger oﬀer larger or equal to ΠGF
2 will be
accepted by ﬁrm 2. If condition (5) is not fulﬁlled, a merger will be accepted
only if the acquisition price is larger or equal to ΠT
2. Hence the acquisition
payment is lower if greenﬁeld investment is credible. The acceptance of a joint
venture by the local ﬁrm similarly depends on the credibility of greenﬁeld
investment.
3.2 Joint Venture
In case of a joint venture, denoted by the superscript J, the market structure
does not change as all ﬁrms remain independent. Both the local ﬁrm, assum-
ing that it has agreed to a joint venture, and the multinational may reduce
marginal costs. However, these cost-reducing investments are not contractible
when agreeing on a joint venture. This may be due to imperfect monitoring of
investments by the other party or to the impossibility to prove an insuﬃcient
investment in the courtroom, so that both investments are voluntary contri-
butions to a joint cost reduction. Furthermore, since the local ﬁrm remains
independent, it is more productive as it would be as a dependent division of
the multinational in case of a merger. Let ζ
J denote the marginal cost after
investments have been made. Marginal cost ζ
J is equal to
ζ
J = c − γ(βI1 + I2), (6)
where I1 (I2) denotes the investment of ﬁrm 1 (2). The parameter γ measures
the general eﬃciency of investments, whereas β,0 < β ≤ 1, expresses the
relative disadvantage of the multinational relative to a local ﬁrm in carrying
out an investment in an unfamiliar environment.
7In the product market, both the local joint venture ﬁrm and the mul-
tinational compete against each other and the independent local ﬁrm. The
































In case of a joint venture, both ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts w.r.t. their in-
vestments independently. Investment costs are assumed to be quadratic, so





















respectively. The parameter δ measures the marginal cost of investment. The
tilde denotes equilibrium proﬁts on the product market after best-response
outputs have been determined.











2(2bδ − (1 + β
2)γ2)
. (11)
A necessary condition for an interior solution is
δ >














(a − c)2δ(2bδ − β
2γ2)





(a − c)2δ(2bδ − γ2)
8(2bδ − (1 + β
2)γ2)
. (14)
The asterisk denotes equilibrium proﬁts after optimal cost-reducing invest-


















both ﬁrms’ proﬁts rise with the eﬃciency parameters. In particular, also the
local ﬁrm is interested in forming a joint venture with a strong multinational.
3.3 Merger and Acquisition
In case of a merger, denoted by the superscript M, the multinational is able
to determine investments for both divisions, 1 and 2. On the product market,
ﬁrm 1 (i.e., the parent ﬁrm) competes only with ﬁrm 3. Within this duopoly,





























M is the marginal cost after investments I1 and I2 have been made
by the respective divisions. The marginal cost ζ
M is equal to
9ζ
M = c − γβ(I1 + I2). (18)
The role of the general eﬃciency parameter γ remains unchanged but β, ex-
pressing the relative disadvantage of the multinational in making investments
in the host country, applies to both divisions’ investments now. The proﬁt of





















Condition (20) is met if condition (12) holds, because the diﬀerence between
(20) and (12) is positive due to a > c and 0 < β ≤ 1:












2)c) > 0. (21)
















Proﬁts increase with the eﬃciency parameters γ and β and decrease with
the cost parameter δ. Due to
Π
M∗








10there is a positive lower bound for the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm. Note also
that this proﬁt is gross proﬁt, not taking into account the acquisition price
of the target ﬁrm. The acquisition price, in turn, depends on the credibility
of greenﬁeld investment or exporting, respectively.
4 Equilibrium FDI Mode
In case of a credible greenﬁeld investment threat, the acquisition price for the
target ﬁrm in case of a merger is equal to (a−c)2/16b, i.e., equal to the proﬁt
the target would realize if it faced competition from the multinational’s local
subsidiary (and the other local ﬁrm). Furthermore, this is also the minimum
proﬁt a local ﬁrm can guarantee itself when being invited to form a joint
venture. The local ﬁrm is therefore better oﬀ with a joint venture if its proﬁt
ΠJ∗
2 is larger than its proﬁt when rejecting the oﬀer and facing competition
by a multinational ﬁrm, i.e., a proﬁt of size (a − c)2/16b. Hence, the local











⇒ 2bδ(1 + 2β
2)δ − (1 + β
2)γ
2 > 0
which is always true according to (13). Expression (25) proves Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 The local ﬁrm agrees to a joint venture if greenﬁeld investment
is a credible threat.
Since the multinational can be sure that its potential target will accept
a joint venture, it has the choice among all possible types of FDI modes.
Lemma 2 has the result.
11Lemma 2 The multinational prefers a joint venture to a merger if greenﬁeld
investment is a credible threat. It prefers a merger to a greenﬁeld investment
if the ﬁxed cost of greenﬁeld investment is suﬃciently big.
Proof: Due to (24), the merger proﬁt ΠM∗
1 minus the acquisition price will
never be less than 7(a − c)2/144b, which is larger than the greenﬁeld proﬁt
ΠG
1 if F ≥ (a − c)2/72b. Hence, the merger dominates greenﬁeld investment
if the ﬁxed cost is suﬃciently large.
A joint venture dominates a merger if ΠJ∗
1 exceeds ΠM∗

















Condition (26) can be written as














which is positive in the relevant range.6 ￿
Note that it could well be the case that a merger dominates greenﬁeld
investment irrespective of the size of F, as long as F still supports the cred-
ibility of greenﬁeld investment. Expression (24) gives the gross merger proﬁt
without any cost saving and is thus a lower bound for the after merger proﬁt.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 prove Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 If greenﬁeld investment is a credible threat and greenﬁeld
investment involves a suﬃciently large ﬁxed cost, both the multinational and
a local ﬁrm agree upon a joint venture.
6f(δ) is positive because f(δ = (1 + β
2)γ2/2b) = (9 + 10β
2 + β








> 0 because (2β
2 + 17β
4 − 7)γ4 >
−7γ4, 4b(14 − 11β
2)δγ2 > 12bδγ2 > 6(1 + β
2)γ2 > 6γ2 and 24b2δ
2 > 6(1 + β
2)γ2 > 6γ2
due to β ≤ 1.
12The outside option for both the potential target of a merger and a local
ﬁrm invited to form a joint venture improves if greenﬁeld investment is not
a credible threat. In this case, the local ﬁrm can guarantee itself a proﬁt
ΠT
2 , which is larger than ΠGF
2 and increasing in t. It is no longer clear then
whether the local ﬁrm will accept a joint venture proposal as Lemma 3 shows:
Lemma 3 The local ﬁrm rejects a joint venture oﬀer if exporting is a credible
threat, and δ and/or t are suﬃciently large.
Proof: The local ﬁrm is better oﬀ under trade if ΠT
2 is larger than ΠJ∗
2 which
requires
(a − c − t)2
b
≥
2δ(a − c)2(2bδ − γ2)
(2bδ − (a + β
2)γ2)
. (28)
This comparison depends on the size of trade cost t. Obviously, condition
(28) cannot hold for t = 0 as the outside options for trade and greenﬁeld













Expression (29) increases with δ and approaches 7(a − c)2/144b as δ → ∞.
Hence, the local ﬁrm rejects a joint venture proposal for suﬃciently large δ
and t. ￿
While it not clear whether a joint venture will be preferred by both
parties, the preference of the multinational is obvious. The joint venture
proﬁt ΠJ∗
1 does not depend on the credibility of greenﬁeld investment, but
the acquisition price in case of a merger is larger with exporting than with a
credible greenﬁeld investment threat. Hence, the net proﬁt of a merger will be
less under the threat of exporting than with a credible greenﬁeld investment
13threat, and according to Lemma 2, the multinational prefers a joint venture
to a merger already with a credible greenﬁeld investment threat. Therefore,
it will also do so if the merger proﬁt is even smaller, which proves Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 The multinational prefers a joint venture to a merger if exporting
is a credible threat.
However, if the local ﬁrm does not accept the joint venture proposal, the
multinational has to decide whether it would like to merge with the local ﬁrm
or serve the foreign market by exports. Since ΠT
2 is the acquisition price, this
decision depends on a comparison between ΠM∗
1 and the aggregate proﬁts of






(a − c)2 + 5t2 − 2t(a − c)
8b
. (30)
If (30) is larger than ΠM∗
1 the multinational prefers exporting. Due to (24),
a necessary condition for this preference is









According to (31), exporting is preferred to a merger for suﬃciently low
levels of trade cost t.7 Note that t ≤ (a − c)/15 does not necessarily violate
the assumption that the local ﬁrm rejects any joint venture proposal. For












Expression (29) increases with δ and approaches 31(a−c)2/3600b as δ → ∞.
7Condition (31) is also fulﬁlled for t ≥ (a − c)/3 which is excluded as the foreign ﬁrm
cannot proﬁtably export to the local market if t ≥ (a − c)/3.
14Hence, if the local ﬁrm rejects any proposal to form a joint venture, the
multinational’s choice between exporting and M&A depends on the level
of t. The implications of this and of Lemmas 3 and 4 are summarized in
Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 Suppose that exporting is a credible threat. If δ and/or t are
suﬃciently small, the multinational proposes a joint venture and the local
ﬁrm accepts. If δ and/or t are so large that the local ﬁrm does not agree
to a joint venture, there exists a   t with 0 ≤   t < (a − c)/15 such that the
multinational prefers M&A (exporting) to exporting (M&A) if t ≥   t (t <   t).
As the outside option for the local ﬁrm for zero trade costs is the same
with trade and with greenﬁeld investment, Remark 1 is obvious.
Remark 1 If trade costs are zero, the multinational and the local ﬁrm agree
on a joint venture.
So far, we have assumed that both merger and joint ventures do not
require any ﬁxed costs. Including (diﬀerent) ﬁxed costs across the board may
change the equilibrium FDI mode. Although no general preference order can
be derived, we are able to explore the relative advantage of a joint venture to
a merger depending on the eﬃciency parameters β and γ. We ﬁnd that joint
ventures (mergers) are relatively more attractive for the multinational, the
more (less) eﬃcient cost-reducing investments are. For a low productivity of
the multinational, merger proﬁts are relatively larger (smaller) for low (high)
levels of general eﬃciency.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper examined the determinants of a multinational ﬁrm’s choice
between greenﬁeld investment, acquisition of a local ﬁrm, cooperation with
15a local ﬁrm through a joint venture, and exporting. We assumed that for
M&A and a joint venture to yield synergies the participating ﬁrms had to
make additional investments. We found that there exist a strong interde-
pendence between the diﬀerent modes of FDI. In particular, we showed that
the proﬁtability of greenﬁeld investment relative to exporting determines the
outside options of local ﬁrms and hence their decision of whether to accept a
merger or joint venture oﬀer. If greenﬁeld investment is more proﬁtable than
exporting, this reduces the price the multinational has to oﬀer to acquire
a local ﬁrm with the consequence that the multinational may prefer M&A
to greenﬁeld investment. We also derived conditions under which a credible
threat of greenﬁeld investment is likely to support a joint venture agreement.
If the multinational prefers exporting to greenﬁeld investment, a local ﬁrm
may not accept a joint venture, and the multinational will choose M&A if
the trade cost is suﬃciently large.
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